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The involvement of the law in the family is generally considered
inevitable and desirable. The family is often depicted as the locus of
important and delicate problems, which demand legal intervention through
designated tools commonly referred to as “family law.” This Paper
questions the veracity of this depiction with regards to the paradigmatic
family dispute—divorce. Divorce cases are composed of three sub-cases: the
divorce itself (i.e., the legal separation of the parties), child custody, and the
division of property. The Paper examines whether, and to what extent,
courts and legal rules decide family disputes. It argues that, with the rise of
personal considerations such as autonomy and the best interest of the child,
the law has become almost irrelevant to divorce and that courts currently
have little substantive influence over custody disputes. The diminishing
importance of the law in these contexts is particularly striking when
compared to the reality of matrimonial property issues. Family law
addresses familial considerations, legal norms, and judicial procedures.
Based on the shortcomings this Paper identifies in the regulation of divorce
and child custody, namely the gap between the perceived and actual
regulation of these matters, this Paper calls for reconsideration of the
regulation of these issues.
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INTRODUCTION

Currently, the term “family law” is an almost oxymoronic fusion
between the situs of emotion and love on the one hand and duties and rights
on the other. This was not always the case. Only a century ago, the family
unit was considered the nuclear building block of society and very relevant
to the law. 1 But over time, new principles were adopted and old ones
discarded. Changes such as the rise of autonomy, individualism within the
family, and the best interest of the child have altered the center of gravity
within the field.
Despite these changes, for the most part, the understanding of “the
family” as a matter for law and adjudication has remained broadly accepted
and even desired. 2 This Paper discusses the extent to which changes in
Western family law and practice have pushed the law away from “the
family.” 3 While some legal debates over the definition of “the family” and
ǂ Lecturer, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Sometimes scholarly work takes a village. I
would like to thank mine: Celia Fassberg and Mathias Reimann provided insights,
knowledgeable remarks and continuous support. Miri Gur-Arye, Hanoch Dagan, Dafna
Hacker, Alon Harel, Jonathan Herring, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Ben Ohavi, Kirsten
Scheiwe, Rhona Schuz, Harry Willekens, Ruth Zafran, and Eyal Zamir have all kindly shared
their time and expertise and provided insightful comments about this paper. Finally, the
participants of the Oxford Law Academic Visitors’ Colloquium, the “Families in Law”
Symposium at IDC Herzelia and the Private Law workshop at Tel Aviv University have all
offered comments and thoughts. To all of them, for all of that, I am grateful. This research
was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No.186/14).
See Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189,
190 (2011) (“[D]omestic relations/family law did not always exist; rather, it was invented,
[over the course of the twentieth century] and the ideological implications of that act of
creation remain embedded in the field today.”).
See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
495, 531 (1992); Mary Ann Glendon, Modern Marriage Law and Its Underlying
Assumptions: The New Marriage and the New Property, 13 FAM. L. Q. 441, 443 (1980). See
also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 3 (U. N.C. Press ed., 1988) (demonstrating the perception
of a connection between the notion of the family as the building-block of society and the
need to regulate it through law in the U.S. colonies). The exception to this legal
conceptualization of the family is marriage, an area in which some have argued the law is
now irrelevant. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A
THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 95–141 (2004); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Meaning of
Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 29, 57 (Anita
Bernstein ed., 2006). See also Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot Abolish Marriage A
Partial Defense of Legal Marriage Based on the Structure of Intimate Duties, 90 IND. L. J.,
1261, 1293–94 (2015) (some criticize even this limited exception).
The “West” has been described as “the Atlantic littoral of Europe (the British Isles,
Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, and Iberia) plus America . . . Australia, New
Zealand, and all other European overseas settlements.” William H. McNeill, Western Civ
in World Politics: What We Mean by the West, FOREIGN POL. RES. INST. 513, 513–14
(1997).
1

2

3
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familial relationships (who is a parent, who is a spouse, what rights, if any,
do grandparents have, etc.) still invite broad legal intervention, others might
not.
This Paper examines these changes through the lens of a typical
family law case, composed of three main familial disputes: spousal
relations, 4 parental relations, 5 and marital property. 6 Analyzing these three
issues, this Paper argues that in the first two matters, family considerations
overshadow the law to the point that they no longer pose real legal issues
requiring court decisions. 7 In contrast, the third issue demonstrates a
modern compromise between the family and the law. 8 It affords more room
to civil law considerations by balancing them with family needs. 9 The Paper
substantiates this argument by contrasting traditional and current attitudes
towards these matters, as well as by addressing their regulation in different
legal systems.
The Paper does not purport to offer a comprehensive comparative
review, but rather, it demonstrates the prevalence of the phenomenon
discussed. Though no one legal system is discussed in detail, the findings of
this Paper are generally relevant to all Western legal systems. Further, since
the Paper is restricted to only three familial matters, it makes no statement
regarding family law as a whole. Instead, it calls attention to changes to
several core family law issues and suggests that these changes warrant a
reconsideration as to how “the family” and the law interact.
II.

FAMILY AND THE LAW—MIND THE GAP

Modern law focuses on regulating special interpersonal
relationships—mainly spousal and parental relationships. 10 This regulation
includes an accounting of property and monetary rights amongst family
members in an attempt to support family life and help individual members
adjust to changes and breakdowns in the family. 11 These regulations also
promote specific public interests in family life. 12 The paradigmatic “family
law” case has always involved the trio of suits often brought together upon

4
5
6
7
8
9

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts III, IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
Jonathan Herring, Making Family Law More Careful, in VULNERABILITIES, CARE AND

10

FAMILY LAW 43, 43 (Julie Wallbank & Jonathan Herring eds., 2013) [hereinafter Herring,
Making Family].
See id. at 53–54.
Id. at 52–57 (addressing the protective, adjustive, and supportive “functions” of family law).
11
12
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the breakdown of a marriage or similar alternative spousal relationship. 13
Such alternatives are not discussed here, but reflect similar tendencies.
These suits are marriage dissolution, child custody, and property division. 14
The history of family law as a distinct legal field is a short one, 15
though the legal regulation of familial issues appeared in ancient
legislations. 16 In the nineteenth-century, Savigny discussed this new notion,
distinguishing between family law and potentialities law—the law of
patrimony. 17 Savigny described family law as the aggregation of statuses—
relationships between spouses, parents, and children—and the law of
patrimony as part of private law regulating the dealings and interactions of
individuals through property and obligations. 18 Modern legal thought
classifies matters involving the family—marriage, parenthood, support, and
property—as all belonging to family law. 19 However, we may have moved into
a new era: one in which some of the traditional statuses no longer lie within
the legal spectrum, while at the same time, marital property has entered into
the realm of the family.
In order to examine this assumption, the Paper proceeds by
demonstrating the historical evolution and the current state of affairs
regarding each of the three issues mentioned. The Paper illustrates that the
connection between “the family” and “the law” is loosening in different
ways, all of which erode the notion of “family law.” The Paper argues that
divorce and child custody are matters resolved without meaningful judicial
or legal intervention, while family property is addressed in a legal manner
that reflects a limited consideration of the family. Before making this
argument, however, an explanation regarding how the terms “law” and “legal
matters” will be applied throughout this discussion is required.
Typical alternatives to marriage include common law marriages, civil unions, domestic
partnerships, and cohabitation. See generally JEANINE ELBAZ, MARRIAGE AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES (N.Y.U. Press, 2009).
See, e.g., REBECCA PROBERT, FAMILY LIFE AND THE LAW: UNDER ONE ROOF 2 (2007).
See Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, The Emergence of Droit De Famille and Familienrecht
in Continental Europe and the Introduction of Family Law in England, 28 J. FAM. HIST. 31,
37–38 (2003) (in continental law, this development was dated to the eighteenth century and
attributed mainly to Hugo and Savigny, and in common law, this development seems to have
happened later still). See also Halley, supra note 1, at 196–210.
See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW,
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 18–21 (1989).
Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony Distinction and its Place in the Global
Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 811, 813 (2010) (describing
FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 276–78 (William
Holloway trans., Hyperion Press ed., 1979) (1867)).
Id. at 814.
See generally Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1, 5 (2011) (noting that these topics within family law continue to be areas of focus
in law schools).
13

14
15

16

17

18
19
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Is going to the cinema a legal matter? Surely, there are legal rules
that apply: the ticket is a contract, or a testament thereto; the cinema is
bound by safety regulations, and there are likely numerous copyright and
franchise rules that allow the cinema to exist and ensure that patrons can
view films therein. But most people would not consider going to the cinema
a strictly legal matter. Similarly, this Paper does not aim to suggest that when
a matter, such as divorce, becomes “not legal,” the law is somehow alienated
in its entirety. Naturally, the law serves as a regulating framework regarding
most human institutions and interactions. Some extreme cases may require
resolution through legal proceedings, but the majority will not. In this sense,
the matter is “not legal.” The law, and particularly the judicial process, is no
longer the tool that regulates it on a day-to-day basis. 20
So, when suggesting that an issue is not “legal,” this does not mean
the law has nothing to do with it. In most instances, the law created and
generally regulates the matter, but the law is not the tool used to operate and
manage it, and the court is not the best forum in which to address it.
Typically, litigation is not only cost-ineffective but also unhelpful. 21 The
parties may bargain in the shadow, 22 but that shadow is not cast by the law
because legal rules or predictions of legal outcomes are not at play. The law
has pre-regulated the issue, and time has shown that these issues are now
governed by other mechanisms. Presently, when disputes arise, the judge’s
role becomes more of an overseer of the process than an adjudicator using
legal expertise.
The argument does not go so far as to claim there are no cases that
are indeed “legal” or that the court’s involvement is never necessary, only
19F

Rory Van Loot, The Corporation as a Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 549 (2016)
(“The main institutional actor in the private consumer legal system is not the arbitration
tribunal, but the consumer-facing corporation.”). See also Jane Aiken & Stephen Wizner,
Law as Social Work, 11 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 63, 64 (2003) (“It is commonly accepted
that the professional expertise of lawyers is limited to ‘legal’ issues: those involving the
identification, interpretation, and application of relevant legal rules and concepts. Lawyers
provide legal advice, counsel, representation, and advocacy to and on behalf of individual
clients in private legal settings and public legal arenas. Pursuing social justice is not an explicit
goal of the legal profession.”).
See generally Craig C. Martin, Avoiding the Inefficiency of Litigation, COMMITTEE ON
PRETRIAL PRAC. & DISCOVERY (2007).
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 Yale. L.J. 950, 997 (1979). [hereinafter Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining
in the Shadow]. Contrary to my contentions, Mnookin and Kornhauser once argued:
Divorcing parents do not bargain over the division of family wealth and custodial prerogatives
in a vacuum; they bargain in the shadow of the law. The legal rules governing alimony, child
support, marital property, and custody give each parent certain claims based on what each
would get if the case went to trial. In other words, the outcome that the law will impose if no
agreement is reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips.
20

21

22

Id.
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that the law is no longer the centerpiece and leading concept in these areas.
In most cases that do end up in court, the law has little bearing on the actual
decision, and legal tools would rarely be used in reaching a solution. It is
only in this sense that this Paper points to the diminishing importance of
the law and courts in the field of family law, while it overtly concedes the
law still regulates “the family” through legislation.
Furthermore, it may very well be that other issues that are
considered “legal” are treated in a similarly non-legal manner to some
extent. For example, a heavy reliance on experts is clearly prevalent in
medical malpractice cases. 23 This does not negate the veracity of the
argument regarding family law. It merely suggests that the same arguments
may apply in other areas of the law as well and that further examination of
these areas may also be required.
III.

DIVORCE AND THE LAW

The first few chapters in a typical family law book are dedicated to
marriage and its legal regulation, thus pointing to the centrality of marriage
in family law. 24 However, the importance of marriage and its dissolution as
an actual legal issue, is questionable. Other works have discussed the
declining involvement of the law in marriage, 25 and as it will be argued, legal
notions and legal adjudication are almost irrelevant when it comes to divorce
by itself.

A.

The Evolution of Divorce

Prior to relationships becoming matters of law, spousal
arrangements were matters of private choice. 26 They were created and
dissolved, de facto, by spouses moving in together or parting ways. 27 Once
law entered the equation, first through religion and later as an independent
secular agent, marriage and divorce transformed from a personal, social
See Faiza Jibril, The Medical Expert Witness Litigation Guide, EXPERT INST. (Aug. 25,
2020),
https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/the-medical-expert-witness-alitigation-guide/ [https://perma.cc/25FU-WY3W] (stating that expert testimony can be
necessary to determine whether the accused was negligent by comparing the accused actions
against the medical community’s standard of care). But cf. David E. Seidelson, Medical
Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 158, 160 (1966) (stating
that there has been an effort by courts to eliminate the need of expert testimony in certain
medical malpractice cases).
Herring, Making Family, supra note 10, at 50.
See, e.g., Sharon Shakargy, Marriage by the State or Married to the State, 9 J. PRIV. INT’L
L. 499, 510–16 (2013).
See GLENDON, supra note 16, at 20.
Id. at 21. See also H.F. JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN
LAW 113 (2d ed. 1967).
23

24
25

26
27
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matter into a legal one. Law was introduced to divorce as early as the
fifteenth-century B.C.E, through the norms of Biblical and subsequent
Jewish Law. 28 However, this notion took time to sink in. In Western society,
marriage was a social and spiritual rather than a legal phenomenon for
centuries—though it did have legal consequences. 29 This was the case in
Rome. 30 The structured legal doctrine of marriage emerged in the West,
through Christianity, much later in the twelfth century C.E. 31 The most
important and broad-reaching change occurred in 1563 at the Council of
Trent, which formalized marriage under Christian dogma and strictly
forbade divorce. 32 From that point on, Canon Law allowed for annulment
of marriage but only under circumstances manifesting a grave breach of the
marriage, such as adultery or the inability to consummate the marriage. 33 In
all other cases, even the most dissatisfied spouses could only hope for an
order allowing separation from bed and board. 34 A granting of this order was
only possible following proof of adultery, desertion, or cruelty, and it
provided no permission to remarry. 35
Divorce was first re-established in the West by England and her
colonies during the seventeenth century. 36 Even still, it was an exceedingly

See Deuteronomy 24:1 (Biblical law acknowledged divorce and subjected it to cause. The
Documentary Hypothesis dates this source to the sixth century BCE, however, it is
considered to reflect a much earlier reality). This rule was further clarified in subsequent
Jewish sources such as the Mishna (Ktubot tractate), I. Bedzow 9:10, and the Talmud
(Gitin tractate). Y. Berakhot 2:14 (2d).
See GLENDON, supra note 16, at 21. See also JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO
CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 19–22 (1997)
(discussing pre-sacramental Christian marriages).
GLENDON, supra note 16, at 21; see also PAUL DU PLESSIS, BORKOWSKI’S TEXTBOOK ON
ROMAN LAW 118 (4th ed. 2010) (“Marriage in Roman Law was . . . purely a social act with
certain legal consequences.”).
WITTE, supra note 29, at 23.
JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 433
(1987); WITTE, supra note 29, at 38, 42.
BRUNDAGE, supra note 32, at 288, 370–71.
WITTE, supra note 29, at 65. This means the couple does not live together, but the marriage
is functionally, though not technically, dissolved. As a result, remarriage is forbidden. Id.
28

29

30

31
32

33
34

35
36

Id.
See Sybil Wolfram, Divorce in England 1700-1857, 5 OXFORD. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 155,

156–57 (1985) (the first divorce by act of parliament was granted in 1670 to Lord Roos, but
divorce through private act of parliament only became a regular procedure following the
divorce of Duke of Norfolk in 1700). Similarly, in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, divorce
was legalized in 1629 for grounds such as adultery, cruelty, and desertion. At that time,
divorce had to be approved by the governor, which made the procedure somewhat similar
to the English divorce by act of parliament. See Betty Malesky, Divorce: Dilemma For Early
Americans, ARCHIVES (June 21, 2012), http://www.archives.com/experts/maleskybetty/divorce-in-family-history-research.html
[https://perma.cc/G3YT-YBET].
Other
colonies introduced divorce later. For example, in South Carolina, divorce was first granted
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rare procedure, 37 effectively available only to men in cases involving
adultery. 38 Other unhappy marriages were simply to be “borne as a cross.” 39
Even after civil courts obtained jurisdiction over divorce during the
nineteenth century, 40 the grounds for the procedure remained essentially
unaltered, “merely adding cruelty, desertion and a few qualifying
aggravations of adultery incest and bigamy.” 41 Likewise, in France, where
divorce was permitted in 1884, 42 it was available only upon an offering of
proof of a grave marital breach, such as adultery, insanity, or having
committed some shameful crime. 43 The laws of other European countries
reflected similar norms. 44
During the twentieth century, the focal point of discussions
surrounding divorce in Western legal codes shifted from whether to allow
divorce—under limited circumstances—to the extent to which divorce should
be attainable and, ultimately, to whether specific grounds ought to be
required at all. 45 This was nothing short of a revolution. Divorce ceased to
be a rare measure used only in extreme cases and instead gained growing
social acceptance. 46
Moreover, the grounds for divorce expanded immensely during the
last decades of the twentieth century. In the United Kingdom (U.K.), the
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage can now be the basis for divorce. 47
Adultery, cruelty (now called “unreasonable behavior”), and desertion—the
three classic grounds for divorce—all still provide the basis for such a

in 1868. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1996).
There were only 131 cases of divorce in England throughout the 18th century. Wolfram,
supra note 36, at 157.
37

38

Id.

GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, PYGMALION act V (1913).
RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY
403–04 (1988).
Wolfram, supra note 36, at 157.
PHILLIPS, supra note 40, at 403. While divorce had been permissible prior, a ban on
divorce was reinstated in the Code Civil in 1816.
Id.; FREDERIC R. COUDERT, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS IN EUROPE: A STUDY IN
COMPARATIVE LITIGATION 23–24 (1993).
See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 40, at 420, 424, 430 (England, France, and Germany);
COUDERT, supra note 43, at 23–24 (France).
Masha Antokolskaia, Comparative Family Law: Moving with the Times?, in COMPARATIVE
LAW: A HANDBOOK 241, 247 (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds., 2007) [hereinafter
Antokolskaia, Comparative Family Law].
Id. at 247; see also KATHARINA BOELE-WOELKI, FRÉDÉRIQUE FERRAND, CRISTINA
GONZÁLEZ BEILFUSS, MAARIT JÄNTERÄ-JAREBORG, NIGEL LOWE, DIETER MARTINY &
WALTER PINTENS, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW REGARDING DIVORCE AND
MAINTENANCE BETWEEN FORMER SPOUSES 24–25 (2004).
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, c. 18, § 1 (Eng.).
39
40

41
42

43

44

45

46

47
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breakdown. 48 However, the novelty of this legislation was marked by the
addition of circumstances that do not reflect fault on the part of either party.
For example, a two-year separation followed by a consensual petition for
divorce or a five-year separation followed by a contested petition is grounds
for irretrievable breakdown. 49 Other Western countries have also loosened
their divorce laws—some by adding no-fault grounds and some by
eliminating grounds altogether. In Germany and France, an extended
separation is itself a sufficient ground for divorce: one year where a petition
is uncontested and three in the case of a contested petition in Germany. 50 In
France, a two-year separation suffices where a petition is contested, 51 and an
uncontested petition requires no separation at all. 52 In the United States,
waiting periods following fault-based divorce have been shortened, and all
states now have no-fault divorce with waiting periods generally ranging
between six months and two years. 53 Furthermore, “[m]ost courts do not
question one spouse’s claim that the couple has ‘irreconcilable
differences.’” 54
Taken together, these changes demonstrate a shift in the legal
approach towards divorce. Once highly regulated and hardly attainable,
divorce has gradually become more easily accessible under a wider range of
circumstances. Neither judges nor legal grounds, such as fault, govern and
decide the matter. Instead, the will of the parties and their autonomous
decisions are the principal drivers. This begs the question, should courts be
involved at all? Naturally, these changes make an enormous difference in
the lives of parties involved in divorce proceedings. However, they also
extend beyond the parties and local legal arrangements, reflecting a
transformation in the meaning of divorce and creating a new phenomenon
altogether.

Id. § 1(2)(a)–(c) (first added through the Divorce Reform Act of 1969, c. 55, § 2 (UK)). In
the late 1980s, the Law Commission attempted to abolish the grounds for divorce altogether.
These attempts led to the Family Law Act 1996, which was later repealed. See Rhona Schuz,
Divorce Reform–Part I: The Ground for Divorce, 23 FAMILY L. 580, 580 (1993).
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, c. 18, § 1(2)(d), (e) (Eng.) (first added through the Divorce
Reform Act of 1969).
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 1566, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/ (Ger.) (discussing the presumption of a
breakdown of the marriage as grounds for divorce). According to section 1565(2), in
exceptional hardship cases, divorce may be granted following less than a year of separation.
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 238 (Fr.) (discussing divorce on grounds of
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage).
Masha Antokolskaia, Dissolution of Marriage in Western Countries, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF FAMILY LAW AND POLICY 87 (John Eekelaar & Rob George eds., 2014).
Strauss, supra note 2, at 1271 (noting that a waiting period may be somewhat prolonged in
disputed cases).
48

49

50

51

52

53

54

Id.
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Divorce Revisited

The change in the legal treatment of divorce is a seminal one. To
a great extent, divorce has been taken out of the hands of the public, as
represented by the Church or the State, and placed in the hands of the
parties. 55 Today, the State still controls the form, but not the substance, of
divorce. Because the State is still the sole guardian of the registry, 56 it is the
sole authority with the power to determine whether an individual is legally
divorced. However, the State does very little, if anything at all, to control its
exercise of that power or to limit the availability of divorce. The outcomes
of this shift are more far-reaching than they initially appear. Now, not only
is divorce more flexible, but it is also governed chiefly by the wishes of the
parties, which grants it a deeper meaning.
Traditionally, when seeking to obtain a divorce, fault was the only
way out of a marriage—and innocence was a mighty shield. A guilty party
could not ask for a divorce based on his or her own guilt. 57 And an innocent
party could hold on to their marriage even if it became a sham, such as when
the other spouse left the marital home and severed all ties with the family, 58
or obnoxious, such as when the other spouse brought a mistress into the
family home. 59 Though some may have deemed it advisable that such
marriages end, at that time, the law did not. Thus, an innocent party had a
right to preserve their marriage for whatever reason he or she chose. 60 Some
reasons included: avoiding the stigma of divorce, safeguarding children’s
welfare or financial interests, and leveraging a better deal in an eventual
divorce by forcing the party at fault to buy his or her way out of the
marriage. 61 Yet another reason might have been sheer spite or a desire to
punish the spouse at fault. 62 In any event, this structure gave an innocent
party a right to his or her marriage. It also made divorce a legal issue: legal
57F

58F

59F

60F

61F

GLENDON, supra note 16, at 31–34. But see Jonathan Herring, Divorce, Internet Hubs and
Stephen Cretney, in FIFTY YEARS OF FAMILY LAW 187, 197 (Rebecca Probert & Chris
Barton eds., 2012) [hereinafter Herring, Divorce, Internet Hubs] (discussing the public
55

interest in divorce reflected in public investments including legal aid).
Joel A. Nichols, Misunderstanding Marriage and Missing Religion, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV
195, 195 (2011) (acknowledging how, in the United States, at times “couples that were
married in a different state from their current locale face issues of whether their state will
legally ‘recognize’ the validity of their out-of-state marriage.”).
Antokolskaia, Comparative Family Law, supra note 45, at 250.
MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 374 (2d ed. 1950) (this was a requirement
under English law).
Id. (this was a requirement under Belgian law).
56

57
58

59
60

Id.

Allen M. Parkman, Reforming Divorce Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 379, 386 (2001)
(“The result [of requiring the “innocent” party to initiate divorce] could often be a much
more generous compensation and custodial package than the divorcing spouse preferred.”).
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rules had to be interpreted, facts needed to be checked and applied
appropriately by judges trained and versed in the law, and only then would
dissolution of the marriage be possible. The modern reality of divorce
differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In most parts of the modern Western world, divorce is always
attainable. 63 If one party decides he or she wants to terminate the marriage,
divorce is the probable outcome. It may be a matter of time, related to the
duration of separation, or a matter of money, where one spouse pays the
other to concede to a divorce and thus shorten the waiting period. But it will
almost inevitably happen. 64 So much so that some countries changed their
laws. In Denmark, an uncontested divorce may be granted via an
administrative procedure. 65 This notion of a non-judiciary divorce is not
unique. In Australia, divorce is obtainable by an administrative procedure
accomplished by mailing forms through the post, without the need for a
court appearance, though this is only possible in uncontested divorces
where no children are involved. 66 Similarly, the United Kingdom’s Family
Justice Review, an advisory panel to the Ministry of Justice, suggested
divorce should be an administrative procedure conducted through an
online hub, with legal intervention limited to cases where a divorce is
disputed. 67 A more interesting situation is revealed when the situation is
viewed from the respondent spouse’s perspective. A spouse reluctant to
divorce, who has not infringed on the marriage, may nonetheless be forced

With the exception of religious divorce, particularly Jewish divorce in Israel (where no civil
divorce exists for most couples). See Jodi M. Solovy, Civil Enforcement of Jewish Marriage
and Divorce: Constitutional Accommodation of a Religious Marriage, 45 DEPAUL L. REV.
493, 497 (1996). Notably, the religious Jewish divorce is sometimes unattainable, mostly due
to objections and interruptions by the spouses, usually husbands. See Susan Weiss, Divorce
Law
in
Israel,
THE
JERUSALEM
POST
(Nov.
29,
2018),
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/divorce-law-in-israel-573185
[https://perma.cc/62FAUYNN].
This, however, is not necessarily true in all jurisdictions and under all circumstances. See,
e.g., Babiarz v. Poland, App. No. 1955/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) (where the ECHR upheld
the decision of a Polish court to preserve a marriage as per the respondent’s request and
deny the divorce application of a party that was found to be solely responsible for the
breakdown of his marriage).
BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 21–22.
Family Law Act 1975 s 98A (Austl.). See also PATRICK PARKINSON, AUSTRALIAN FAMILY
LAW IN CONTEXT 338 (2009).
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE DEP’T FOR EDUC. & THE WELSH ASSEMBLY GOV’T: FAMILY
JUSTICE REVIEW FINAL REPORT, 25, 51 (2011). At point 131, the report says that the court
would be overseeing divorce through an administrative capacity, but it later clarifies that it is
not the judges but rather the “Family Justice Service” that would oversee the case. Id. at 25,
172. See also Stephen Cretney, Private Ordering and Divorce – How Far Can We Go, 33
FAM. L. 399 (2003) (discussing this idea without controversy).
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into a divorce by their counterpart. 68 Previously, marriages could be
dissolved only following a showing of fault and, in the past few decades,
through consent. Now, they cannot be preserved without spousal consent,
regardless of the parties’ acts or faults. This means the right to divorce has
developed in a way that overthrows and replaces the right to preserve a
marriage. A person’s “right” to keep their marriage is now subject to, and
much weaker than, their spouse’s “right” to divorce.
These changes affect not only the balance between the parties but
also the conceptualization of divorce. Arguably, divorce is becoming less a
legal matter in need of adjudication and more a private matter subject to
administrative regulation. In legal proceedings, rights are weighed and
balanced against each other. In a world where divorce was subject to cause,
the offended party’s right to exit the marriage depended upon the offender’s
guilt. Only the establishment of a grave enough breach of marital obligations
provided one with the right to demand a divorce. In a fault-based world, an
innocent party could easily prevent a divorce. So long as his or her behavior
fell within the confines of the law, that spouse’s marital status could not be
revoked against his or her will. This is no longer the case in today’s world.
Though many jurisdictions still appear to maintain a traditional outlook
regarding the right to keep one’s marriage as reflected in their laws, the
reality, as well as their actual socio-legal positions on the matter, have
changed.

C.

The Law as a Disservice

The changes divorce laws underwent are extensive, and they have
altered the entire concept of divorce as a legal phenomenon. These changes
have become normative. While some consequences of divorce—such as
division of property—may call for judicial attention, divorce itself is different.
The result of these changes is that, in some legal systems, divorce is
becoming an autonomous action of both parties, or even of just one of
them. 69 In other countries, where court involvement is still required, the role
of the court is virtually reduced to issuing a rubber stamp. 70 Even when
See, e.g., Owens v. Owens [2018] UKSC 41. Here, a wife failed to prove that her husband’s
moody and argumentative behavior was such that she could not be reasonably expected to
live with him, and all she had to do was wait a while longer in order to establish a long enough
separation period that would be in itself sufficient ground for divorce under section 1(2)(e)
of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973. Id.
See Ayelet Hoffmann Libson, Not My Fault: Morality and Divorce Law in the Liberal
State, 93 TUL. L. REV. 599, 601 (2019) (“The right to exit is derivative of the centrality of
autonomy to liberal thought and signifies a person’s right to detach oneself from a
relationship with another person.”).
Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and
Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783, 795 (1999) (“[In California] judges rubber stamp any claim
68
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parties negotiate over the divorce, they do not do so “in the shadow of the
law” because the law has no say regarding the divorce itself. 71 In such cases,
the court applies very few, if any, of its special skills—such as rules analysis,
fact-finding, etc. Therefore, courts may not be the ideal, and surely not a
necessary, arena in which to entertain separation discussions. 72 Indeed,
conducting divorce proceedings in court probably amounts to an
unwarranted consumption of limited judicial resources.
But inefficiency is neither the only nor the main problem with
leaving divorce in the hands of courts. Other, more significant, problems
involve the parties themselves. First, people tend to hire lawyers or apply
for legal aid when they go to court based on the assumption that they need
a legal expert when appearing before the court. If divorce is, in fact, not a
legal matter, the money spent on lawyers is probably wasted. Indeed, the
U.K.’s administrative divorce proposal could limit the need for lawyers.
True, lawyers are often hired to manage the divorce as a whole—including
child custody, property division, and other related issues—so little, if any, of
the money paid goes towards obtaining the divorce itself. Furthermore, the
bureaucracy of divorce, which ranges from simply filling out forms to
appearing before a court, is imposing on many people who would prefer to
have professional assistance. Moreover, in some cases, clients use lawyers
to hasten the process—by demonstrating the relationship’s breakdown or
arguing over the length of separation. But it may be that in other cases, the
notion of divorce as a legal matter surely misleads lawyers as well, inducing
them to spend time and effort making a case for their clients when no such
case is truly necessary. Inasmuch as legal tools cannot change the outcome
of these cases, the use of lawyers may be a wasteful mistake.
Leaving divorce in the hands of courts is also an emotional mistake.
Parties are probably better off not fighting unwinnable fights, and society
might be better off deterring people from dealing with emotional crises
through hopeless lawsuits. Putting a spouse who would have liked to
maintain their marriage through a long, arduous procedure is an
unnecessary emotional strain that simply adds to the inherent perils and
sorrows of divorce. 73
This is not to suggest that a divorce should be a purely
administrative process composed only of filling out forms. Having a formal
divorce process that facilitates discourse may provide the parties with an
opportunity to negotiate and plan their separation, rather than simply an
arena for discussing whether separation may be allowed at all. In the absence
of these formalized discussions, petitioning spouses may be unduly shielded
for no-fault divorce, without any honest or meaningful effort to determine whether the
breakdown really is ‘irretrievable’”).
Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 22, at 968.
See BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 21–22.
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 2, at 1308 (“Litigation also creates psychological tensions.”).
71
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from the emotional pain their soon-to-be ex-spouse is experiencing.
Discussions may also increase the parties’ willingness to negotiate openly
and compensate for the hurt caused by the termination of their marriage.
However, this proceeding need not be “legal,” nor must it occur in a
courtroom.
A meaningful divorce process may be of great value, even when not
used for a legal inquiry. Divorce proceedings serve a symbolic role, which
may help a reluctant party mourn the loss of their dreams and come to terms
with their separation. As Jonathan Herring beautifully notes, the end of a
marriage should be treated with solemnity rather than being guided purely
by considerations of efficiency. 74 After all, “[w]e could, when a person dies,
arrange for an economical and efficient way of disposing of the body. We
do not. The death of the person is marked as a serious moment, respecting
what has been lost and looking forward to the future.” 75 Likewise, requiring
some sort of formal divorce proceedings, as opposed to allowing for mail or
otherwise unceremonious delivery of notice, can promote a serious and
respectful attitude towards the marriage. Such a requirement acknowledges
losing something of meaning and importance. It can also give voice to an
injured spouse, allowing them to be heard by their former partner. This is
particularly important in a crumbling marriage, where it may be difficult for
spouses to pause and listen to one another. Acknowledging such needs
might call for a rethinking of the norms underlying the divorce process—
including the idea that fault is better left undiscussed. These norms
potentially deny the parties an opportunity to have their feeling of injustice
recognized and their grievances considered. 76
Justice and recognition of grievances are very important goals when
dealing with such a potentially dramatic life change. However, it is doubtful
that traditional court proceedings serve these principles. Even if court
processes changed, offering improved negotiation space and grief support,
other institutions and professions might be better equipped to cater to these
emotional and psychological needs than courts of law. Such notions have
gained traction, as reflected in laws requiring family counseling as a part of,
and almost in lieu of, separation proceedings. 77 These requirements change
not only the venue but, more importantly, the contents of the discussion.
76F

Herring, Divorce, Internet Hubs, supra note 55, at 197.
Id. at 196.
See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS 116 (2014); LAW COMMISSION, Facing the Future: A Discussion Paper on
The Ground For Divorce, 1988, Law Com No 170, ¶ 3.22 (UK).
See, e.g., Children and Families Act 2014, c. 6, § 10 (UK). The Mandatory Information
and Assessment Meetings in cases involving children in the U.K. are aimed at providing
information regarding mediating family disputes and ADR. Likewise the Family Dispute
Resolution procedure is mandatory in all cases involving children in Australia according to
section 60I of the Family Law Act of 1975. See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60I (Austl.).
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THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

Parental responsibility is another central element in family law. 78
Disputes regarding child custody and guardianship are an integral part of
most divorce suits where the parties have children together. 79 However, the
relevance of the law to such disputes is questionable.

A.

The Evolution of Custody Norms

The notion of parental disputes regarding children is relatively
new. In antiquity, children were sometimes treated as part of their father’s
property. 80 As head of the household, the father owned the dwellers of his
household to different extents. 81 And although children were not considered
their father’s property under the Common Law, they were still perceived as
economic assets. 82 As was the case under Roman Law, all Common Law
parental rights were vested solely in the father. 83 Furthermore, since
marriage suspended the legal capacity of women, it was essential that the
father attain legal control over the family’s children. 84 Under this legal
assumption, a father had an immediate right to his legitimate children and
could use this right as he saw fit. 85 Fathers’ rights over their children were so
See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Reflections on “Innovations in Family Dispute
Resolution,” 75 MD. L. R. 1, 1 n.1 (2016) (sharing similar scholarly suggestions calling for

new models to address family law issues, new interdisciplinary partnerships to support these
models, and expanded training for lawyers navigating the broad range of family dispute
resolution options). However, these suggestions, and many others like them, are
insufficiently grounded in theoretical phenomenology.
Herring, Making Family, supra note 10, at 50.
Christopher Allan Jeffreys, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Child Custody
Resolution, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 135 (1986).
See generally Child Custody–Parental Rights vs. the Child’s Best Interest, THE
CONVERSATION (Nov. 14, 2014), https://theconversation.com/child-custody-parental-rightsvs-the-childs-best-interest-33620 [https://perma.cc/BU9R-FELE] (outlining a brief history of
child custody in colonial America).
See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody and Parental Authority in France,
Louisiana and Other States of the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 4 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 283, 286–88 (1981) (discussing the changes in Roman Law and the impact of
that law over modern Western laws); Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child
Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423, 435 (1976–77) (mentioning, alongside the famous
Roman Law example, the laws of ancient Persia, Egypt, Greece and Gaul); BRIAN H. BIX,
THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: FAMILY LAW 59 (2014).
MASON, supra note 36, at xii.
Roth, supra note 81, at 426–27.
See MASON, supra note 36, at 59 (noting the more recent nineteenth-century decision
quoted and discussed there would have applied during earlier times as well).
As opposed to illegitimate children who, by definition, had no legal fathers and therefore
stayed with their mothers. See Unmarried Fathers’ Rights, LAWSHELF,
https://lawshelf.com/coursewarecontentview/unmarried-fathers78
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unquestioned that child custody was not an issue in a divorce proceeding
because children were automatically granted to their father. 86 The few rights
mothers did have regarding their children were subjected to the rights of
fathers. In France, for example, a mother could only assert her parental
rights if the father died while the children were still minors. 87 As time went
on, the proprietary aspect of the father-child relationship was softened,
allowing courts to remove children from the custody of abusive fathers. 88
However, such fathers retained the right to control their children’s
upbringing and could assert their interest in having custody of their children
or withholding it from others. 89
The regulation of child custody upon divorce gradually
transformed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 90 During that
time, courts in the United States contemplated diverging from the Common
Law as to the question of paternal superiority. 91 Some courts were willing, in
select cases, to give mothers custody of their young children in order to
promote the children’s welfare. 92 A deeper change arose in England, aimed

rights/#:~:text=Traditionally%2C%20under%20the%20common%20law,the%20primary%2
0right%20to%20custody.&text=Historically%2C%20family%20law%20statutes%20gave%20
deference%20to%20mother's%20in%20custody%20disputes
[https://perma.cc/P3QV67D8].
Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, The Future of Children, 4 CHILDREN
& DIVORCE 121, 121 (1994).
See Blakesley, supra note 81, at 289–90; Roth, supra note 81, at 427. In England, where
the law followed Roman legal traditions, guardians were appointed in the event of a father’s
death, restricting mothers’ rights even further. Kelly, supra note 86, at 121.
Roth, supra note 81, at page 428 (referring to England and the United States).
See Letter from Caroline Sheridan Norton, English author, to the Queen on Lord
Chancellor Cranford’s Marriage and Divorce Bill 63 (1855) (on file with Indiana University),
http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/vwwp/view?docId=VAB7092&chunk.id=d1e505&toc.id=&
brand=vwwp;query=#docView [https://perma.cc/N5QR-TXES] (“[In England] at that time
the law was . . . that a man might take children from the mother at any age, and without any
fault or offence on her part.”). See also Blakesley, supra note 81, at 289–99 (explaining that
in France, fathers were free to control their children as they saw fit, but only so long as they
were not found to be abusive); Kelly, supra note 86, at 122 (noting that mothers in Colonial
America were granted no custodial rights during their marriages or after divorce); MASON,
supra note 36, at 17–18 (explaining that in Colonial America, women did not sue for their
children, but that may be either because they did not think they stood a chance of winning
or because they did, in fact, have the children, as one of the leading causes for divorce was
desertion “and it is unlikely that the father deserted with children in tow.”); EUROPEAN
FAMILY LAW IN ACTION – VOL. III: PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES 77–104 (Katharina BoeleWoelki et al. eds., 2005) (providing state-by-state civil law examples).
Kelly, supra note 86, at 122.
86

87

88
89

90

Id.
See MASON, supra note 36, at 60–61; Kelly, supra note 86, at 122; Lynne Marie Kohm,
Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in American
Jurisprudence, 10 J. L. FAM. STUD. 337, 367 (2007).
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at accommodating mothers’ rights. 93 English wives, who fought for the
recognition of their separate legal capacity and rights, also sought to extend
them to include parental rights. 94 After centuries of male domination over
child custody, 95 the suffragette movement argued for mothers’ custodial
rights over children during marriage and upon divorce. 96 Even before the
suffragettes, women fought to change this reality. One such woman was
Caroline Norton, who, after being deprived of her children following a
divorce, 97 later fought for the enactment of the English Custody of Infants
Act 1839, 98 which allowed judges some discretion regarding child custody. 99
The Act empowered courts to grant mothers access to the custody of their
children under the age of seven, 100 thus paving the way to maternal rights. 101

See MASON, supra note 36, at 51, for a discussion of a similar change in Colonial America,
where Mason attributes the change not only, or mainly, to the rise of woman’s rights, but also
to what she refers to as the “cult of motherhood,” which understood child rearing as the duty
of the mother for the benefit of the child. These observations may be relevant to England,
given the strong legal ties between the Colonies and England at that time. See Kelly, supra
note 86, at 113 (discussing how more direct and independent thinking regarding mothers’
rights appears to have emerged in the United States only during the 1920s, when it was
sometimes argued that a wife who was entitled to a divorce due to her husband’s fault was
also entitled to custody of her children).
Mary Lyndon Shanley, Suffrage, Protective Labor Legislation, and Married Women’s
Property Laws in England, 12 SIGNS 62, 72 (1986).
See Martha J. Bailey, England’s First Custody of Infants Act, 20 QUEEN’S L. J. 391, 394
(1994–95) (explaining that even though fathers could allow mothers access and even custody
of their children, the law did not grant mothers the right to demand custody or even access
to their children; hence, mothers were usually left subject to a fathers’ good graces).
See MASON, supra note 36, at 57 (explaining this phenomenon was not unique to England
and mentioning expansion by the New York State of the Married Woman’s Property Act of
1860 such that it would grant joint guardianship and equal powers to married mothers and
fathers). See also Norton, supra note 89.
See Bailey, supra note 95, at 402 (providing a detailed account of Norton’s efforts); Norton,
supra note 89, at 64–69 (providing the sad details of Norton’s own story).
See
Custody
rights
and
domestic
violence, U.K. PARLIAMENT,
http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/privatelives/relationships/overview/custodyrights/ [https://perma.cc/FF9E-UJMW]; Norton, supra
note 89 (noting that the high point of Norton’s campaign in promoting the 1839 bill was her
letter to Queen Victoria).
Innocent mothers were allowed to sue for custody of children under the age of seven and
for access to older children. See Bailey, supra note 95, at 393, 433–34. Until this legislation,
though parties could make a private agreement granting custodial rights to mothers, courts
were hesitant to make such orders. Id. Notably, mothers who were guilty of adultery could
not submit such petitions. Id.
Kelly, supra note 86, at 122; Roth, supra note 81, at 425.
Bailey, supra note 95, at 393 (noting the Act left that decision to the discretion of the court,
and therefore had little effect on the actual rulings, such that fathers were still granted custody
in most cases).
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Later, Parliament extended maternal rights to children under the age of
sixteen. 102
Over time, the English focus on maternal rights and the American
focus on child welfare merged into a single legal notion giving preference to
the mother as a custodian of children. 103 Some jurisdictions went as far as to
formulate this notion in a legal rule—the Tender Years Doctrine. 104 Under
this doctrine, courts assumed it was best for the child to remain with its
mother, as a matter of either nature 105 or science, 106 and mothers were
regularly awarded custody over their young children, 107 displaying a
complete reversal from the previous paternal supremacy norm. This
presumption later became the legal norm in most Western jurisdictions. 108

B.

Custody Revisited

Much of the above-mentioned evolution surrounding the
regulation of custody can be attributed to the shift of legal attention from
family units to the individuals within the family—who are themselves the
subject of rights—as well as a move from a patriarch-centered focus to a more
general people-centered focus, which included children. Additionally, the

The Custody of Infants Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 12, art. 1 (UK).
See NIGEL LOWE & GILLIAN DOUGLAS, BROMLEY’S FAMILY LAW 312–13 (Oxford U.
Press 11 ed., 2015) (noting that in the United Kingdom, the preference was formulated via
discretion given to courts, allowing them to designate rights to the mother, and not as a prima
facia presumption).
See generally Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of
the Tender Years Doctrine, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 769, 770 (Dec. 2004).
See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 95, at 433 (regarding England); MASON, supra note 36, at 53
(regarding the United States); Blakesley, supra note 81, at 316 (regarding France).
MASON, supra note 36, at 164–65 (arguing that with the rise of the social sciences, mothers’
supremacy was ratified based on empirical observations).
Id. at 61 (citing several cases, including one, Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend.
63, 77 (1840), where the court went so far as to say about a mother that “the law of nature
has given to her an attachment for her infant offspring which no other relative will be likely
to possess in an equal degree”).
Kohm, supra note 92, at 338–39 (“[T]he doctrine of the best interests of the child is
genuinely and uniquely American, and that the doctrine itself has indeed greatly influenced
child law globally.”). Indeed, this is a prevailing doctrine in the United States. See Roth, supra
note 81, at 425 (regarding Common Law); KATHARINA BOELE-WOELKI, FRÉDÉRIQUE
FERRAND, CRISTINA GONZÁLEZ BEILFUSS, MAARIT JÄNTERÄ-JAREBORG, NIGEL LOWE,
DIETER MARTINY & WALTER PINTENS, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW
REGARDING PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES 36–37 (2007) (regarding Civil Law). At least in
some jurisdictions, courts generally gave custody to mothers, reflecting what was perceived
as the child’s best interest. See Artis, supra note 104, at 770. Furthermore, if the mother
demonstrated to the court that she is competent and responsible, she would be granted
custody not only of children of tender age but also of older siblings of a tender-aged child.
See Blakesley, supra note 81, at 316–18.
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child’s needs and interests became the leading consideration in custody
matters, 109 though sometimes tempered by other legal presumptions. 110
The “best interest of the child” concept is now the prevailing
principle regularly present in both national 111 and international 112 legal
documents throughout the Western world. Despite its importance, this
doctrine is “the most heralded, derided and relied upon standard in family
law today. It is heralded because it espouses the best and highest standard;
it is derided because it is necessarily subjective; and it is relied upon because
there is nothing better.” 113
In custody cases, the best interest of the child standard means the
court grants custodial rights to maximize the child’s welfare. 114 The court’s
decision can place the child under joint custody of both parents, with only
one parent, with or without visitation rights for the other parent, or with a
third party. In essence, unlike its predecessors, the best interest of the child
standard requires sorting out details and patterns of social and psychological
importance, weighing them in light of theories regarding emotional wellness,
and assessing the child’s future development based on foreshadowing signs
demonstrated in the existing reality. 115 No part of this process involves legal
reasoning. Such evaluations are not based on legal understanding, and
courts are generally neither trained, nor ideally suited, to undertake them. 116

This terminology emerged in court decisions in Colonial America during the early 1700s
and began infringing on parental authority late in the nineteenth century, before reaching a
peak in worldwide prevalence and child-focused interpretation in the late 1970s. See Kohm,
supra note 92, at 353–56. This highpoint was further strengthened with the 1989 United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, stating in Article 3 that the best interest of
the child is a primary consideration in matters involving children. See id.
See Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other
Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. 267, 267–76 (1986); MASON, supra note 36, at 129–33;
BIX, supra note 81, at 188 (regarding the legal presumptions of primary caretaker,
psychological parent, joint custody, etc.).
See supra note 105 (discussing examples).
See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
(explaining that the best interest of the child as a primary consideration in various
proceedings including legal ones); see also Kohm, supra note 92, at 351.
Kohm, supra note 92, at 337.
Importantly, the assumption that placement with the mother would necessarily be the best
outcome for the child no longer exists, hence the transformative importance of the shift from
the tender years doctrine to the best interest of the child principle. See MASON, supra note
36, at 123. This same shift is also a part of the difficulty in this transition, as there is no
concrete guideline to substitute the maternal preference rule and to guide judges. See infra
text surrounding note 126.
See J. Carl Funderburk, Best Interest of the Child Should Not Be an Ambiguous Term,
33 CHILD.’S LEGAL RTS. J. 229, 234 (2013) (“‘best interest’ should protect the rights of the
child”).
See Aiken & Wizner, supra note 20, at 66.
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Judges are professionally trained to find facts and determine what
has happened. They have no special skills in determining what will happen.
They are trained at making conclusions based on the analysis between facts
and legal provisions. Furthermore, once the legal principle is asserted—i.e.,
once it is decided that the case should be resolved on the basis of the best
interest of the child—most of the remaining work is not strictly “legal” in
nature. 117 Jurists are trained to make conclusions based on their application
of the facts and legal provisions, while the best interest of the child standard
requires conclusions based on the application of facts to sociological and
psychological theories. 118 Consequently, when judges determine child
custody arrangements, they no longer turn to their law books or legal
precedent, but instead rely heavily on expert opinions. 119 More often than
not, courts apply these experts’ opinions “as is” since judges lack the training
and skills to refute or question them. 120 Thus, in this manner, judges make
the experts the de facto judges of the case. While all these phenomena exist
in other legal contexts, 121 they seldom appear all at once. The accumulation
See Re G (Children) [2012] EWCA (Civ) 1233 (Eng.) (noting that exceptions do exist,
such as the alignment of child welfare with modern reality); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALBERT J.
SOLNIT, SONJA GOLDSTEIN & ANNA FREUD, THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 17–62
(1998) (outlining a comprehensive theory for applying a best interest of the child framework,
or at least a decision-making tool that utilizes social science knowledge); Kohm, supra note
92, at 353 (stating that the effect of the book was a growing reliance on expert testimony in
judicial decision-making, as well as judges themselves deciding based on their own
observations and convictions).
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 117, at 46–48 (referring to the law’s inability to supervise
the day-to-day life of families or predict the future and arguing that “the intricate character of
the parent-child relationship places it beyond the constructive, though not the destructive,
reach of the law,” while suggesting that judges allocate custody and then pull away and allow
the selected caregiver to meet the child’s changing needs).
See Kohm, supra note 92, at 34 n.221 (quoting LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN,
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 858 (2002)) (“Courts may be in the poorest
position of all to know what the facts are; custody decisions are based on short hearings (if
any testimony), with heavy reliance on paid experts.”).
See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decision Making, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 751 (1988); Robert H. Mnookin,
Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975). See also Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law,
55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2014 (2003) (“Especially in contrast to the approaches it
replaced, which provided fixed rules for child custody that were explicitly gender-based, the
best-interests standard ‘seems wonderfully simple, egalitarian, and flexible.’ It also, as
observed, ‘expresses the right societal message about the responsibility of parents to put their
children’s interests first.’ But the praise is faint in comparison to the criticism; these same
commentators go on to assert that the standard ‘has no objective content’ and ‘is not
determinate enough to produce predictable results, yielding instead a process that is
contentious, expensive, subjective, and unjust.’ They are joined by a legion of scholars who
have produced a body of criticism that is as extensive as the standard is amorphous.”).
See Jeffrey J. Parker, Contingent Expert Witness Fees: Access and Legitimacy, 64 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1363, 1363 (1991) (“Testimony by expert witnesses is a practical necessity in many
117

118

119
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of this heavy reliance on experts, prospective assessment, non-legal subject
matter, and determinative formulation points to a deeper incompatibility
between the subject matter and court adjudication.
Even when courts use their discretion in such cases, they only apply
legal thinking and mechanisms to a limited extent. The best interests of the
child principle has no legal content, so judicial discretion is applied absent
any guidelines. 122 Thus, despite their efforts, judges are unsuccessful in
formulating a clear approach towards child custody disputes between
parents. In contrast to divorce proceedings, where judges have very little
discretion regarding the outcome, in child custody decisions, their
discretion is completely unhindered by legal considerations. However, the
outcome is the same. In both cases, a judge’s work is not judicial in nature.
In the absence of legal considerations, other experts essentially decide child
custody disputes. 123 Naturally, that decision is not strictly “legal” in nature.
Certain cases involve allegations regarding related legal matters,
such as claims of neglect or molestation. Such cases call for legal decisionmaking, but its substance is of criminal or welfare law, which is beyond the
scope of pure family law. Even in “pure” custody cases, where fact-finding
is generally undertaken by experts, and no evidence is presented to the
courts, courts still play a major role in coordinating and managing the
decision-making in the case and even, on occasion, in choosing between
conflicting expert opinions. Whenever experts are used, legal and non-legal
considerations and arguments are intertwined. The court must use typical
judicial skills, such as questioning witnesses and establishing credibility to
evaluate an expert opinion. Alongside this, the court must use other experts
and bodies of knowledge, in which lawyers are not typically well versed, to
assess the experts’ methods and the theories used. In most legal cases, the
expert opinion comprises only one component of the case, such that the

legal disputes.”); STEVEN PEGALIS & HARVEY WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 267 (1980) (Expert testimony is generally necessary in medical malpractice
cases).
Even when legal principles were introduced in an effort to guide judicial discretion, some
criticized them as not representing the best interests of the child. See Kohm, supra note 92,
at 373–74 (discussing Scott’s approximation rule that was adopted by the American Law
Institute as a guideline for judicial discretion); MASON, supra note 36, at 133 (discussing the
primary caretaker presumption); BIX, supra note 81, at 187–89.
MASON, supra note 36, at 161–62 (building a multi-layered argument regarding the
influence of social sciences over the law in custody cases). First, the social sciences have a
theoretical influence over legislators and over judicial decision-making; second, social
scientists are called upon to give testimony and evaluate cases; third, courts refer to decisionmaking processes of these sciences, rather than using the legal decision-making processes.
Id. See also BIX, supra note 81, at 162–85 (discussing the aspects laid out by Mason in greater
depth).
122
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use of a court is both reasonable and worthwhile. 124 However, in “pure”
custody cases—those not involving allegations of violence or neglect—the
entire case revolves around the expert opinion. 125 Indeed, the best interest
of the child doctrine does not reflect a legal formula.
Moreover, this doctrine is undisputed, 126 so any applicable legal
work has already been completed—leaving little for the judge to contribute.
Hence, the legal system is inappropriate for resolving issues regarding the
principle of the best interest of the child; not because the courts cannot do
the job, but because other professions and professionals might likely do it
better.

C.

The Law as a Disservice

One might argue that even if the use of courts and lawyers offers
nothing but a smoke screen, disguising non-judicial decision-making, the law
is still of use since it offers a state-sanctioned structure for dispute resolution.
However, even in this regard, the law may be doing the parties a disservice.
First, courts are accustomed to rewarding and punishing.
Therefore, they are more likely to, and in fact do, mistakenly use custody
rights to reward or punish parents or misevaluate the proper reaction to
parental actions. 127 Thus, their input as to what is in the best interest of the
child may be well-intended but ill-executed.
Second, the law is usually used to resolving disputes after-the-fact,
and jurists are, for the most part, trained in terminating relationships.
However, when parties have children, despite the marriage’s failure, the
familial relationship often lives on as the parties continue to share parental
responsibilities and attachments. Hence, the law is neither a good tool for
dealing with parental conflicts, nor an appropriate one. The law knows how
See generally Stephen Gomez, Family Law Expert Witness and an Introduction to Family
Law, EXPERT INST., https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/family-law-expert-

124

witness-introduction-family-law/ [https://perma.cc/9WKB-JTSK] (describing the different
types of expert witnesses).
Note that in many cases only one expert is involved, appointed by the court; hence, this
expert becomes a “substitute judge.” See generally Stephanie Domitrovich, Mara L. Merlino
& James T. Richardson, State Trial Judge Use of Court Appointed Experts: Survey Results
and Comparisons, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 371 (2010) (survey conducted about court appointed
experts).
See, e.g., BIX, supra note 81, at 11–12.
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 117, at 81 (“Where abandonment by the biological parent
is involuntary, judges, also out of an adult-cantered sense of justice . . . may use the child’s
placement as restitution to parents who are innocent victims of war, illness, poverty,
deception or any another circumstances ‘beyond their control.’”). Such decisions reflect
adult and law-oriented reasoning, while the best interest of the child would suggest leaving
the child in the care of their current guardians and avoiding yet another separation from
parental figures might be best.
125

126
127

590

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

to end relationships, but parents who are going through a family dispute still
need to raise children and parent together. Therefore, they are not in need
of the law’s severing power; rather, they need a healing caregiver.
There are other ongoing, potentially divisive, relationships that are
handled by courts—the most obvious being business partnerships involving
fiduciary duties. But the needs of co-parents are different and more dire
than those of other relationships for several reasons. One reason is that
familial disputes are usually more emotional, as they are “closer to home”
in the most literal sense. In Savigny’s terms, custody is familial and not
patrimonial. 128 Therefore, in the absence of rules, courts do not employ legal
discretion regarding the questions arising before them. Rather, they respond
based on social and emotional considerations, areas in which they have no
professional advantage.
Another reason is that unlike business partnerships, with coparenting, there is no way out of the relationship. Contrary to business
partners, co-parents must stay in touch, at least on some minimal level,
unless they are willing to risk losing their relationship with their children.
Third, unlike business partnerships, separating co-parents must chart new
waters and create a new relationship with one another in caring for their
children. Such parties need an intervention that permits, encourages, and
even forces the creation of alternative lines of communication, enabling
them to manage their parental duties in the best interest of their children,
notwithstanding the disintegration of their own spousal relationships. These
lines of communication are particularly vital given the high emotional and
financial costs of re-addressing every single disagreement in court, as well as
courts’ general reluctance to discuss daily issues in family life and custody
agreements. Such emotional compromises and psychological processes,
which might be achieved in therapy, are seldom created in a court of law. 129
Creating a state-sanctioned procedure that is clearly and openly governed
by social workers or psychologists might be a better alternative.
V.

MONEY AND THE FAMILY

The last core aspect of family disputes is the monetary aspect of
the relationships—mainly the division of property and mutual support. 130
128
129

See, e.g., VON SAVIGNY, supra note 17, at 281–99.
See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 76, at 114–15.

Another aspect less relevant to the argument made herein is the matter of child support.
The thorny problem of dividing pensions and other special assets lies beyond the scope of
this Article as well. It seems that many jurisdictions, including England, Germany,
Switzerland, and the United States provide for the division of pensions. See Carol Calhoun
& Gregory Needles, The Division of Pensions Across Borders, EMP. BENEFITS LEGAL
RESOURCE
SITE
(Dec.
17,
1996),
https://benefitsattorney.com/articles/aaml/#2_Pensions_in_
Financial_Maintenance
130
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Previously, this Paper argued that two of the three core issues of the
paradigmatic family law cases—divorce and custody—are non-legal subject
matters or, at least, are not best served by courts. By contrast, monetary
issues are increasingly legal matters. 131 While the first two issues were clearly
matters of special familial importance, the monetary aspects paint a more
nuanced picture.
Family-related property issues typically arise when the family breaks
up: when someone leaves the family through death, in which case the
question is one of succession, or, more important to the current discussion,
through separation following the breakdown of a spousal relationship. In
this sense, these matters are highly personal. Further, in terms of substance,
it seems there is an attempt to balance “the family” with property interests.

A.

The Evolution of the Money-Family Relationship

Traditionally, a close connection existed between the division of
property and other aspects of marriage and separation. Matrimonial
property was divided upon divorce, and the division was influenced by the
findings of the divorce petition in several ways. First, in the crown jewel of
family-related monetary rights—maintenance 132—fault influenced both the
fundamental entitlement to such allowance and the amount awarded. 133

[https://perma.cc/4PN4-373A] (United States & England); European Justice, Divorce –
Germany, EUROPEAN JUDICIAL NETWORK, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_divorce-45de-en.do?member=1 [perma.cc/3VPN-HXZ3] (Germany); Reto Reichenbach, What

Happens to Your AHV (Old Age and Survivors’ Insurance), Pension Fund, and Pillar 3a if
You Get Divorced?, CREDIT SUISSE (June 18, 2019), https://www.credit-

suisse.com/ch/en/articles/private-banking/was-geschieht-bei-einer-scheidung-mit-ahv-bvgund-3-saeule-201701.html [https://perma.cc/JRC4-778J] (Switzerland). In some
jurisdictions, like England, this right goes undiscussed as a de facto matter. See Hilary
Woodward, Everyday Financial Remedy Orders: Do They Achieve Fair Pension Provision
on Divorce?, 27 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 151, 171 (2015). Furthermore, even where it is
addressed in court, either the pension is divided similarly to the entire mass of assets, or it is
discussed as part of spousal support. Id. at 153.
Others make this argument as well. See, e.g., BIX, supra note 81, at 12 (“There are,
however, places within American family law where the law has moved towards the opposite
extreme: relatively rigid rules and guidelines, or at least presumptions. The best example of
this is current family law in child support guidelines.”).
Historically, there was a divide between alimony (which was the support given to a
separated wife) and maintenance (which was the support given following divorce). See
ANTHONY DICKEY, FAMILY LAW 346 (5th ed., 2007). In current literature, the terms are
used more loosely: in England and Australia, “maintenance” is now used to refer to both
types of support, while in the United States, “maintenance” is used to refer to temporary
payments and “alimony” to a permanent one. Id. In this paper, the term “maintenance” is
used as a general term for spousal support.
See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS 43 (2002) (“Prior to 1968, . . . fault was almost universally allowed” as
131

132
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Second, in some jurisdictions, fault influenced the division of property upon
divorce. 134 The party at fault would often compensate the other party
financially for the breach of the marriage and breakdown of the
relationship. 135 Courts often awarded the innocent party more, if not the
lion’s share, of the property. 136 Finally, it is worth noting that in cases where
fault influenced custody, it could also influence the monetary provisions
attached to custody. This, at times, forced the party at fault to part with
additional property in order to support or visit their children.

1.

Maintenance

From antiquity to the nineteenth century, Western society limited
married women’s ability to own property. 137 Typically, men, be they fathers,
husbands, or guardians, governed women’s property. 138 Once a woman
married, her husband was obligated to support her, and she had a duty to
cohabit with him. 139 Only when a wife breached the marriage, either by
desertion or adultery, did the husband’s support obligation end. 140 In this
regard, spousal maintenance extended the financial commitment of the
parties beyond the marriage as a benefit to a wife who lost that support
through no fault of her own. 141 Thus, a husband at fault was obligated to
support his wife financially as if the marriage remained, while a guilty wife
lost her entitlement to support. 142 This was based on the perception of
marriage as a generally inseverable bond and the notion of marital fault. 143
a consideration when granting support in the United States, while the subsequent Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act does not allow for the consideration of fault).
See, e.g., FREIER & MCGINN, infra note 182, at 171 (discussing Roman Law); see, e.g.,
Gomez, supra note 124 (discussing modern law in the United States).
See, e.g., Jane Biondi, Who Pays For Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform
Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 616
(1999).
Id. at 621.
See generally Jone Johnson Lewis, A Short History of Women’s Property Rights in the
United States, THOUGHTCO. (June 13, 2019) https://www.thoughtco.com/property-rights-ofwomen-3529578 [https://perma.cc/9KL4-P843].
134

135

136
137

138

Id.

Joan Krauskopf & Rhonda Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective
and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 560 (1974).
DICKEY, supra note 132, at 350.
Id. at 352. See also BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 73. Notably, however, under
Common Law, this right to support was difficult, if even possible, to enforce until 1940. See
DICKEY, supra note 132, at 350; see also John Eekelaar, Post-Divorce Financial Obligations,
in CROSS-CURRENTS – FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
405, 407–08 (Sanford N. Katz, John Eekelaar & Mavis Maclean eds., 2000).
See DICKEY, supra note 132, at 346 (maintenance extended only to provide the supported
wife with a normal life, such as buying food and cloths, paying for housing, etc.).
See Lenore J. Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce
Make a Difference?, 14 FAM. L. Q. 141, 146 (1980). See also Robert W. Kelso, The
139
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141
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This belief underpinned the laws of many European countries until well
into the twentieth century. 144 Despite this, some countries granted
maintenance based on both fairness and need. 145
Today, fault still plays a role in the granting of maintenance in some
jurisdictions. 146 However, in most areas, it does not. 147 Generally speaking,
adults are now expected to be self-sufficient and not rely on support from
an ex-partner after the dissolution of marriage. 148 Maintenance still exists in
many jurisdictions, but establishing a need in the court’s eyes is very
different than it was in the past. 149 Though there is not one clear theory
explaining modern maintenance and guiding its allocation, 150 it is apparent
that fault is, for the most part, not the explanation. 151 In many jurisdictions,
Changing Social Setting of Alimony Law, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 186, 191–92 (1939);
Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us About
Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 DUKE J. GEN. L. & POL’Y 41, 44
(2011) [hereinafter McMullen, Alimony].
See BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 73–74 (Bulgaria, 1944; England and Wales,
144

1971; Germany, 1976; Denmark, 1989; and Austria, 1999).
See id. at 74 (maintenance based on fairness and need exists in Finland, Russia, and
Sweden to some extent).
See id. at 74–75 (fault still plays a role in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Poland and Portugal);
DIETER MARTINY & DIETER SCHWAB, GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE AND MAINTENANCE
BETWEEN FORMER SPOUSES: GERMANY 26 (2002) (discussing Germany, where guilt is
currently used in order to withhold payment to an otherwise deserving party); BOELEWOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 73–74 (fault is also somewhat influential in France); see
also CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 270 (Fr.).
See Eekelaar, supra note 141, at 409–10 (outlining the declining use of maintenance for
influencing marital behavior).
BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 77. A recent Law Commission in England stated
its goal very clearly as “making orders that lead to independence, to the extent that that is
possible in the light of choices made within the marriage, the length of the marriage, the
marital standard of living, the parties’ expectation of a home, and their continued shared
responsibilities in the future, particularly for children.” LAW COMMISSION, Matrimonial
Property, Needs and Agreements, 2014, Law Com No 343, ¶ 1.27 (UK).
See, e.g., Jonathan Herring, Why Financial Orders on Divorce Should Be Unfair, 19 INT’L
J. L. POL. & THE FAM. 218, 219 (2005) [hereinafter Herring, Why Financial Orders] (“To
seek fairness as between the parties is, I suggest, misguided. Not only misguided but
undesirable in this context. Undesirable because the emphasis on fairness between the
parties obscures important wider social interests.”). See also MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 33 (2nd ed., 1998).
Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-thinking Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating
Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 61, 64
(2004) (“Spousal support, however, remains the most difficult of the economic issues to
resolve because it lacks both the underlying rationale of the other issues as well as any
standards by which to predict the amount of the award.”).
Cynthia Lee Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 FAM. L. Q. 271, 278 (2011); Carol Rogerson,
The Canadian Law of Spousal Support, 38 FAM. L. Q. 69, 73–96 (2004). But see BOELEWOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 74–75 (discussing the fact that fault is still relevant in the
sense that in some jurisdictions the party at fault could not receive such support, but
145
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courts order payments to compensate parties who lost financial gains and
earning capabilities due to the marriage 152 and who cannot support
themselves based solely on their share of the marital property after
division. 153 This is indeed a familial consideration in the sense that it
supports familial investments. However, its justification is similar to business
considerations in that it marks a payment for services rendered or
compensation for losses incurred due to the structure of the family life and
investments made in mutual endeavors. Such a mixed approach is apparent
in the German, 154 French, 155 Australian, 156 and Canadian rules for
maintenance, 157 which require the recipient to be unable to provide for
themselves due to childcare, age, or sickness. Maintenance may also be paid
based on the substantial investment in the care given during the marital
life. 158
The duration for support varies between jurisdictions. In many, it
is still officially considered a life-long duty, while in others, the law limits the
maximal duration. 159 However, the actual outcomes are similar since many
systems would, in fact, only grant maintenance for a limited transition
period. 160 Furthermore, while maintenance is still the law on the books of
many countries, it is, in reality, a diminishing phenomenon in many
jurisdictions. 161 For example, in the United States, maintenance is awarded
in just nine percent of cases, compared to approximately twenty-five percent
concluding that “it was common for fault to play a key part in determining maintenance
obligations. However, this is no longer the case.”).
DICKEY, supra note 132, at 354. See also Strauss, supra note 2, at 1272. Another example
is suggested in the Commission on European Family Law Rules, which proposes granting
maintenance based on a balance between the creditor’s need and the debtor ability. See
BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 79.
BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 77.
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], §§ 1570–76 (Ger.). Similar rules exist
in other jurisdictions. See BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 77, 85–91.
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 271 (Fr.). Interestingly, this code was rather recently
changed, in January of 2005, to exclude guilt from its support considerations. These
considerations have been discussed in depth. See FRE�DE�RIQUE FERRAND, GROUNDS FOR
DIVORCE AND MAINTENANCE BETWEEN FORMER SPOUSES: FRANCE 39 (2002).
See PARKINSON, supra note 66, at 452–56 (discussing article 75 of the Australian Family
Law act of 1975). See Family Law Act 1975 § 98A (Austl.).
See Rogerson, supra note 151, at 70 (discussing Canada).
MARTINY & SCHWAB, supra note 146, at 24.
BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 112–13. McMullen, Alimony, supra note 143,
at 76 (“Texas limits alimony awards to couples that have been married for more than ten
years if one spouse cannot support herself. Similarly, Utah only allows alimony payments for
a time period equal to the years of the marriage. The Massachusetts legislature also recently
passed legislation to severely limit alimony. These states have effectively banned alimony in
all but specified circumstances.”).
BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 113.
See MARTINY & SCHWAB, supra note 146, at 23 (noting that Germany is an exception).
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of cases during the 1960s. 162 In Australia, maintenance is awarded in about
seven percent of the cases. 163 Similarly, in Sweden, “spousal support is legally
possible but is in fact ‘unusual.’” 164

2.

Matrimonial and Post-Nuptial Property

The prevailing notion of division of marital property upon
separation is new in most legal systems. 165 Historically, “[t]he individuality of
the spouses was subordinated to the idea of the family as a unit. The
husband represented the unit towards the outside world and was its head in
internal matters.” 166 Most legal systems kept the parties’ property separate,
giving the husband the right to administer—but not own—his wife’s property
during marriage. 167 Though property items that belonged to the wife before
marriage were returned to her upon dissolution, she was not considered a
co-owner of the marital property; 168 hence, the familial property remained
intact. Because children stayed with their father, the regulation of marital
property focused on the interests of the family as a unit rather than on those
of the individuals composing it.
More modern discussions of family property division reveal a very
different vocabulary. For instance, there are rights, formulas for calculating
monetary rates, and far fewer, if any, value-judgments or morals intervening
in the calculation. 169 Generally, guilt is not mentioned, ex-spouses are
expected to be self-sufficient, and divergence from equitable division
Judith G. McMullen, Spousal Support in the 21st Century, 29 WIS. J. L. GENDER, & SOC’Y
1, 6 (2014); Strauss, supra note 2, at 1272.
Belinda Fehlberg, Spousal Maintenance in Australia, 18 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM 1, 27
(2004). See also PARKINSON, supra note 66, at 446 (“Spousal maintenance plays a very
limited role in modern Australian law.”).
Hans-Jürgen Andreß, Barbara Borgloh, Miriam Bröckel, Marco Giesselmann & Dina
Hummelsheim, The Economic Consequences of Partnership Dissolution: A Comparative
Analysis of Panel Studies from Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden, 22
EURO. SOCIO. REV. 533, 538 (2006).
See W.W. Smithers, Matrimonial Property Rights under Modern Spanish and American
Law, 70 U. PA. L. REV. 259, 259–60 (1922) (noting that Spain is an exception).
Max Rheinstein & Mary Ann Glendon, Interspousal Relations, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, VOL. 4 PERSONS AND FAMILY 9 (Max Rheinstein &
Mary Ann Glendon eds., 2004).
See, e.g., LOUIS M. EPSTEIN, THE JEWISH MARRIAGE CONTRACT: A STUDY IN THE
STATUS OF WOMEN IN JEWISH LAW 91–95 (2004) (discussing Jewish law); H. R. Hahlo,
Matrimonial Property Regimes: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 11 OSGOODE HALL L. J.
455, 457, 459 (1973) (discussing European law generally); FRE�DE�RIQUE FERRAND & BENTE
BRAAT, PROPERTY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPOUSES – NATIONAL REPORT: FRANCE 3
(2008) (discussing a later version of this property regime found in the pre-revolutionary
French law).
See FERRAND & BRAAT, supra note 167, at 3 (discussing France).
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 53 (2020) (Commonwealth of Massachusetts
statutory formula for calculating alimony payments).
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requires explanation. 170 In the absence of a right to preserve one’s marriage
against the wishes of a spouse, and where no legally-defined breach of that
marital agreement exists, 171 there is no need to compensate for a breach of
the marital accord. 172 Furthermore, child custody is more flexible. Thus, for
the most part, judges can no longer leave the family and its property in a
single parent’s hands. This is also due, in part, to the decline in rights and
interests afforded to the family as a group, and the rise of those afforded to
individuals. Matrimonial property now employs a more general legal
wording, using arguments such as fairness, reliance, and expectations
instead of family and duty—with the notable exception of the marital
home. 173
The balance between property and family considerations varies
between jurisdictions. In some, marriage is generally not considered to have
any propriety consequences. Such was the case for many years in England. 174
Only in 1973 did English law introduce family-based considerations into the
division of property. 175 These considerations include age, the length of the
marriage, the parties’ respective needs and resources, and even the welfare
of the family—thus demonstrating family-oriented thinking. 176 In the years
since the introduction of these considerations, business-style fairness and
other “market” considerations ultimately pushed the court to create a

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (2020) (State of Colorado statute governing
marital division of property, which presupposes equitable division of property between
parties regardless of marital misconduct).
See Antokolskaia, Comparative Family Law, supra note 45, at 250–53.
This is reflected in the general demise of guilt considerations in different aspects of marital
law: divorce, maintenance, custody, etc. See, e.g., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB]
[CIVIL CODE], § 1566, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/ (Ger.)
(German law on no-fault divorce); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 238 (Fr.) (French
law on no-fault divorce).
See, e.g., DIETER MARTINY & NINA DETHLOFF, PROPERTY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SPOUSES – NATIONAL REPORT: GERMANY 9 (2008) (German courts may allot the use of the
marital home to a divorcing spouse, even if they do not own the house, in exchange for
compensation paid to the spouse who owns the property). But see Chris Clarkson, Jonathan
Hill & Mark Thompson, Study on Matrimonial Property Regimes and the Property of
Unmarried Couples in Private International Law and Internal Law – National Report,
United Kingdom, England, T.M.C. Asser Institute, 7–8 (2003) (any presumption that the
spouse legally owning the marital home, holds the property, in part, in trust for the other,
must be based on factual grounds such as the contribution of funds for the home’s acquisition
or a clear mutual intention to create a trust).
See Clarkson, Hill & Thompson, supra note 173, at 5, 13.
See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, § 25 (Eng.).
Id. This act was interpreted by the court to award a spouse “reasonable requirements,”
which for a wealthy spouse meant evaluation vis-à-vis the marital life. It was less relevant for
most couples with more limited resources. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 148, at 13–
14, ¶ 2.6.
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declared equal division regime. 177 However, reality remains more
traditional. 178 Furthermore, even in jurisdictions where autonomy is stronger
and family considerations are weaker, an equitable division is still possible
when it comes to the division of the marital home, 179 and in some instances,
other property. 180
In other jurisdictions, marital property is now treated in a more
business-like manner. Property owned by the parties is divided upon
separation so that no “family estate” remains. 181 Thus, the ownership of each
of the spouses’ property takes precedence over the interests of the family,
and in particular, the children, the old, and the sick. 182 Investments are

See White v. White [2000] 2 FLR 981 (ruling that although no presumption of equal
division exists, the objective of fairness demands that an equal division should nonetheless
be made, unless there is a good reason not to).
LAW COMMISSION, supra note 148, at 157–58, ¶ 8.5 (arguing that reported cases since
White v. White indicate that wives are seldom being awarded fifty percent of the value of the
assets).
Clarkson, Hill & Thompson, supra note 173, at 7–8 (There is a presumption that the legal
owner of the home holds a part of it in trust for the other; but this presumption must be
based on some factual grounds, such as contributing funds for the acquisition of the home
or a clear mutual intention to create a trust.). Such thinking is also apparent in French and
German law, as discussed below in the text accompanying infra notes 189–92.
This is the case where parties possessed joint accounts and used their money communally.
Clarkson, Hill & Thompson, supra note 173, at 8.
The demise of the family estate is what gives rise to all sorts of post-divorce financial
remedies including maintenance orders, pension divisions, and property transfers. See
LOWE & DOUGLAS, supra note 103, at 837, 843, 845.
Currently, it is the state and not the family that is expected to care for those with nowhere
else to turn in such cases. See id. at 773. This is contrary to Roman law, where despite the
separation of property, if a wife died, the husband kept one-fifth of her dowry for each child
they had, and if her father was no longer alive, he would keep the dowry in its entirety. BRUCE
W. FREIER & THOMAS A.J. MCGINN, CASEBOOK ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW 170, 174 (2004).
Similarly, if the parties separated due to fault of the wife, the husband could keep between
one-sixth and one-eighth of the wife’s dowry as compensation for gifts, expenses, guilt, and
for the children. Id. In some cases, the dowry was not returned at all and was kept by the
husband. DU PLESSIS, supra note 30, at 128. Though the reasons may have been closely
related to patriarchy, the outcome was that a larger portion of the property continued to be
available to the family (i.e., one spouse and the children). Another example is found in
English law prior to 1857, where the husband’s right to administer the wife’s property
survived past the separation of the spouses. See MASHA ANTOKOLSKAIA, HARMONISATION
OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 225 (2006). This was explained as
a right to settle property for the benefit of the husband and children. LAW COMMISSION,
The Financial Consequences of Divorce: The Basic Policy, 1980, Law Com No 103, 7 n.34
(UK). Even later, and up until the White case, the non-owner spouse (usually wives) would
receive a small portion aimed at sustaining them, while the other party kept the majority of
the property; but at that time, there was no apparent consideration of children’s needs. See
generally Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, 53 TUL. L. REV. 697,
697 (1979) (for a discussion of the transformation from family estate to individual rights).
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acknowledged and accounted for, and in many jurisdictions, a personal debt
accrued by one spouse does not bind the other party. 183
The Canadian Supreme Court best articulated the modern
understanding of marital property, suggesting that marriage is seen as “not
only a union, but also . . . a ‘joint endeavor,’ a socio-economic
partnership,” 184 as opposed to de facto unions, which are not economically
united in the same sense. 185 Similarly, in the United States, most jurisdictions
aim to divide matrimonial property “equitably.” 186 Equitability is generally
framed as influenced by spousal contributions to the marriage and the
marital property. 187 In actuality, courts mainly consider these factors in order
to “offset financial imbalance rather than compensate spouses for their
contributions,” 188 allowing for generally equal division. 189 Likewise, in
Germany, where the default rule not only creates a right where gains made
by spouses must be evenly split, 190 parties may also apply one of several
partnership regimes, which are not unique to marriage. 191 The French
regulation is very similar. 192 Even Australian law, which at first glance seems
more family-oriented, uses a similar logic of considering contributions made
to marital assets, as if the family was a joint venture, and adjusting that
division based on future resources and needs. 193
Further, some jurisdictions still allow familial consideration in
property distribution. For example, under German law, when dividing
marital property post-separation, a party may refuse to pay his or her share
of an equalization claim based on gross financial inequality between the
parties. 194 Similar considerations exist, to different extents, in sixteen
American states. 195 It should be noted that such considerations are in no way
reflective of prevailing norms.
KATHARINA BOELE-WOELKI, FRÉDÉRIQUE FERRAND, CRISTINA GONZÁLEZ BEILFUSS,
MAARIT JÄNTERÄ-JAREBORG, NIGEL LOWE, DIETER MARTINY & WALTER PINTENS,
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW REGARDING PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
SPOUSES 165–68 (2013).
Quebec v. A, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61, para. 80 (Can.) (citing in part Bracklow v. Bracklow,
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 (Can.)).
See Jena McGill, Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2013 Term, 68 S.C.L.R. (2d)
137, 181 (2015).
Strauss, supra note 2, at 1271.
Id. at 1272.
Id. Based on empirical data, Strauss notes that judges tend to use equal division as a general
norm when applying equitable distribution rules.
183

184

185

186
187
188

189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Id.

MARTINY & DETHLOFF, supra note 173, at 4.
Id. at 5–6.
See, e.g., FERRAND & BRAAT, supra note 167, at 3 (discussing the similarities in France).
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) pt 79 div 14 (Austl.); PARKINSON, supra note 66, at 517–18.
MARTINY & DETHLOFF, supra note 173, at 23–24.
Strauss, supra note 2, at 1273.
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Familial considerations, which no longer carry weight in many
marital property-related issues, still apply in relation to the division of the
matrimonial home. This is particularly true when children are involved, and
these considerations often complement changes in the child custody regime.
In this context, ownership is not a decisive factor. In Germany, for example,
courts may award the use of the couple’s marital home, even to an ex-spouse
who does not own the real estate, for the benefit of the children. 196 Similarly,
in France, the Civil Code precludes a spouse from disposing of any rights
to property, ensuring that the dwelling and household furniture remain for
the family. 197 While this rule aims mainly at preventing third parties from
claiming rights to the family home, there are also limitations on the interparty rights. The French Code also indicates that the lease to the family
home belongs to both parties, even if it was created before the marriage and
regardless of any other agreements the parties reach. 198 These arrangements,
for the protection of the family home, exist in other jurisdictions as well. 199

B.

Maintenance and Matrimonial Property Revisited

Under traditional family law, money played a big role in the
regulation of the family. It served as a means to keep the family unified and
a way to punish undesirable familial behaviors. 200 Therefore, traditional
family law was highly suspicious of the private regulation of property
regimes. Furthermore, the law saw familial commitment as a lasting one. 201
Hence, it created support duties beyond the scope of the marriage and
divided property based on family-related notions of husbands as patriarchs
and providers rather than on the basis of equality and ownership.202
However, the modern structure of family monetary issues is different.
The significance of this shift towards property regulation is well
demonstrated in English law. England marked the last Western stronghold
of the fully familial property regime 203—banning prenuptial agreements, 204
See MARTINY & DETHLOFF, supra note 173, at 9 (noting that the court may allot the use
of the marital home to the other spouse, but that the spouse might owe compensation to the
owner spouse during the occupancy).
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 215(3) (Fr.).
Id. art. 1751(1). See also FERRAND & BRAAT, supra note 167, at 14.
BOELE-WOELKI ET AL., supra note 46, at 73–74.
See Rheinstein & Glendon, supra note 166 (regarding the unified group notion); DICKEY,
supra note 132, at 350 (regarding behavior regulation).
Glendon, supra note 2, at 454.
196
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198
199
200
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202

Id.

LAW COMMISSION, supra note 148, at 17, ¶ 2.20 (mentioning the twenty-year gap between
England and the rest of Europe in this context).
See id. at 8, ¶ 1.34. The Law Commission suggested recognizing such agreements, which
have already been accepted by the courts. See id.; e.g., Radmacher v. Granatino [2010]
UKSC 42, [2011] 1 AC 534 (UK). It also suggested the introduction of “qualifying nuptial
203

204
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mandating sharing and caring between spouses, 205 and until 1984,
demanding that separating spouses maintain their former partners’ postdivorce finances as if the marriage had never ended. 206 But even English law
has shifted from familial consideration to more property-based legal
parameters. Today, English law allows private accords regarding
matrimonial property. 207 The absence of such agreement calls for a division
of assets—similar to laws of other jurisdictions, though subject to court
discretion. 208 The law complements this formulation through the
consideration of factors intended to temper the effect of legally dividing all
assets with familial concerns. 209 These factors include both the length of the
marriage and the parties’ respective needs and resources. 210
It may seem that not much has changed in English law due to the
preservation of some level of community. Yet, an analysis of the theoretical
meanings of the shift suggests otherwise. Currently, English law bases
property division on the parties’ needs, compensation for lost income due
to the marriage, and the sharing of any surplus or deficiency between the
parties. 211 Now, courts no longer conceive of the family’s property as one
continuous unit and an ongoing commitment that continues even if divorce
legally dissolves the family. 212 Rather, the law treats marital property as a
separable partnership, but one that includes attentive terms. This makes a

agreements” that would allow the parties to create valid arrangements regarding their
property but not to enable a party to avoid meeting the other’s financial needs. LAW
COMMISSION, supra note 148, at 8, ¶ 1.34.
See id. at 1–2, ¶ 1.5.
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, c. 45, § 5 (UK). The Act originally
demanded the court to rule “as to place the parties . . . in the financial position in which they
would have been if the marriage had not broken.” This ‘minimal loss principle’ was repealed
in 1984 at the recommendation of the Law Commission. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note
148, at 13, ¶ 2.5.
See, e.g., LAW COMMISSION, supra note 148, at 8, ¶ 1.35. However, this approach was
criticized by (among others) Herring, Why Financial Orders, supra note 149, at 219.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18, § 23 (UK) and similarly Civil Partnership Act 2004,
c. 33 (UK).
However, this effect is not guaranteed as the Act does not specify the effect these
considerations have, or even what goal the court should aim to achieve. See LAW
COMMISSION, supra note 148, at 12–13, ¶¶ 2.3–2.4.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18, § 25. This was interpreted by the court in White v.
White to award a spouses’ “reasonable requirements,” which for a wealthy spouse meant
evaluation vis-à-vis the marital life, however, it was less relevant for most couples who have
more limited resources. [2000] UKHL 54, [2001] 1 AC 596 (UK). See LAW COMMISSION,
supra note 148, at 13, ¶ 2.6.
See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 148, at 16, ¶¶ 2.15–2.18 (detailing the principles of
Miller v. Miller and McFarlane v. McFarlane. [2006] UKHL 24; [2006] 2 AC 618 (UK)).
For an illuminating discussion, see GILLIAN DOUGLAS, OBLIGATION AND COMMITMENT
IN FAMILY LAW (2018).
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weaker—though persistent—statement regarding the transformation of two
people into an interconnected and committed couple. 213
A similar but more nuanced approach is reflected in the subjection
of the property division to the welfare of the parties’ minor children. 214 This
approach appears to take the family into account, but only considers the
general welfare of minor children shared by the parties and not any other
children in the family. 215 In so doing, the law contemplates the interests of
members of the family, but only to the extent mandated by socio-economic
factors.
The shift from familial considerations to autonomy-based
economic ones expresses a change of theoretical importance. Instead of
perceiving the family as a unit, it envisions a group of distinct individual
parties. It is significantly less concerned with the group, and far more
interested in principles such as ownership, equality, and the independence
of individuals. These notions establish new norms and give different
explanations to existing ones. They introduce a new language, out of the
world of partnerships, into the family.
By the same token, the unique arrangement of maintenance
continues shrinking. 216 Modern law assumes the parties maintain an
obligation of self-sufficiency following divorce, 217 and it generally considers
the equal division of assets to be just and preferable. 218 The fundamental
understanding in maintenance orders “reflect[s] the underlying property law

A similar approach is reflected in the EU legislation. See, e.g., Council Regulation 4/2009
of Dec. 18, 2008, art. 19, Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of
Decisions and Cooperation in Matters Relating to Maintenance Obligations, 2009 O.J. (L 7)
1–79.
This subjugation of property to child welfare is evident in chapter twenty-five, section three,
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which held “to have regard to all the circumstances of
the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family
who has not attained the age of eighteen.” Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 25, § 3.
LOWE & DOUGLAS, supra note 103, at 874–75.
This is true both in the sense that it exists in fewer jurisdictions, and in that less money is
allocated for less time where it still exists. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide
Divorce Cases?: An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV.
401, 469–71 (1996) (showing a fourteen percent decrease in alimony grants within one
decade, as well as a decrease in the sums given, especially to women with some earning
capacity). More recently, in the U.K., courts have shifted toward term limited maintenance
orders. See Michael Gouriet, Wind of Change on Spousal Maintenance (Alimony),
WITHERSWORLDWIDE (2016), http://www.withersworldwide.com/news-publications/windof-change-on-spousal-maintenance-alimony--2 [https://perma.cc/M9NX-34F6].
Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of
Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 837 (1988).
Id. at 866.
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assumption that ‘he who earns it, owns it.’” 219 This has reached the point that
some argue financial needs are seldom taken into account. 220
While the connection between “family” and “law” in marital
property still very much exists, its details and terminology have radically
changed. “The family” is no longer perceived as one unit, connected for life,
but instead as a joint endeavor that creates limited duties between the parties
based on fairness and needs. Thus, maintenance might still be paid under
certain circumstances, and marital property regimes are constructed with
some familial considerations in mind. 221 For example, the correlation
between the duration of the relationship and duration of support paid is
sometimes explained as reflecting a financial merger over time between
spouses 222—a rationale that is of the familial realm. 223 In other jurisdictions,
the duration of the marriage is considered when determining the parties’
contribution to the family assets, for which compensation is required. 224

C.

The Family-Property Mix-Up: A Disservice?

Marital property is changing, and so is “the family.” Most Western
laws no longer treat marriage, or even other formal spousal relationships,
such as civil partnerships, as unique or particularly special relationships. 225
Therefore, there is some doubt as to whether marriage should comprise the
basis for the allocation of rights. 226 Further, family law has already been
overtaken, at least to some extent, by contract law as the governing
principle. 227 Not only are pre- and ante-nuptial agreements becoming more
common, but their growing acceptance reshapes the marital property
regime even in the absence of a signed agreement. This implies that parties
Joan C. Williams, Is Coverture Dead?, 82 GEO. L. REV. 2227, 2257 (1994).
Reynolds, supra note 217, at 852–53. Financial needs were taken into account when a party
suffered poor health or in connection with an opposing party’s litigation misconduct. Id. at
854–55. In England, needs, like age, disability, standard of living, and earning capacity can
be considered in some cases. See LOWE & DOUGLAS, supra note 103, at 870–71.
While, currently, spousal support appears to be rare and sparse, it may be that not much
more was actually paid in the past. See Reynolds, supra note 217, at 829, 843 n.79.
See J. Thomas Oldham, Economic Consequences of Divorce in the United States: Recent
Developments, U. OF HOUS. L. CTR. No. 2016-A-5, 6-10 (Apr. 2, 2016).
Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, The Canadian Experiment with Spousal Support
Guidelines, 45 FAM. L. Q. 241, 254–55 (2011).
Reynolds, supra note 217, at 881 (discussing marital property as means of spousal support
in the United States).
See, e.g., Sharon Shakargy, What Do You Do When They Don’t Say “I Do”? CrossBorder Regulation for Alternative Spousal Relationships, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 427,
439–40 (2015).
Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 267 n.77
(2001).
See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1475–
76 (1992).
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can choose how their property will be divided, rather than being forced into
the default marital property regime suggested by state law.
Modern matrimonial regimes balance the individual and the
familial group, seeking to bridge the gap between the autonomy of the
individual and their commitments to one another. They do not afford
support and reliance to financially able adults, but they do offer some
protection to weaker members of the family. This is accomplished through
special rules regarding the family home, the accounting for non-monetary
contributions to matrimonial property, and consideration of the
circumstances weaker spouses face in the division of property. 228 By doing
so, the marital property regime regulates behavior in a way that accurately
reflects a theoretical change and does not leave weaker parties destitute. It
deters excessive co-dependence but supports some family community and
accounts for some altruistic behavior within family life. This approach offers
a balance between promoting selfless investments, which are good for the
family, and protecting autonomy while deterring over-reliance and selfabsorption. This admittedly imperfect balance is a “good enough” reflection
of current socio-legal norms and an acceptable harmony between “legal”
and “familial” considerations, language, and goals. Thus, unlike the two
cases discussed above, the regulation of matrimonial property is not a
disservice to the family or its members.
VI.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Family law is fragmented and confusing. It is torn between
different notions: autonomy, individualism, responsibility, commitment,
and love. No one piece of legislation constitutes the problem. Rather, the
lack of clear and coherent thinking about “the family” is to blame. This
Paper calls us to revisit the norms and goals of family law and to reshape
them in a theoretically sound and practically fitting manner. This is no easy
task, but it cannot be avoided.
The search for the meaning of family structure entails reconciling—
or choosing—between individualism and family commitments, which is
especially apparent in the discussion of divorce and matrimonial property.
Legal scholars have long noted the fragmentation of the family and the
“emergence of the self-determining, separate individual from the network
of family and group ties.” 229 Mary Ann Glendon argues, “we ha[ve] moved
away from a time when a person’s position in society was determined by the
family and where society itself was but an aggregation of families, toward a
See Reynolds, supra note 217, at 840 n.62.
C.K. Allen, Introduction to HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, at xxvi (1959)
(describing Maine’s view). See also Glendon, supra note 2, at 455 (the author also mentions
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229

the work of Marx in this context).
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situation in which the basic social unit was, for better or worse, becoming
the individual.” 230 On the other hand, the emotional, financial, and practical
co-dependence of family members is as apparent as ever. Indeed, “no man
[or woman] is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent,
a part of the main.” 231
Once the proper theoretical balance between autonomy and
community, and between freedom and commitment, is achieved, the legal
meaning of different familial concepts should be clarified and fine-tuned.
Concepts that have no legal meaning should be omitted from the law
altogether. The discussion above demonstrates the shortcomings and undue
costs imposed by existing divorce regimes. Therefore, giving clearer legal
meaning to the legal commitment in marriage would allow parties to know
what to expect and how to plan their actions. If marriage, by itself, is a legal
commitment, divorce law should reflect as much. If it is not, divorce should
be reconstructed as an administrative matter. The current situation is, as
explained above, dissatisfactory. As long as divorce and marriage have no
clear meaning, courts have very little to contribute to their adjudication. By
the same token, legal meaning should be attributed to the best interests of
the child, enabling courts to apply legal standards and decide cases in a legal
manner. If the best interest of the child is not a real legal concept, custody
cases that are decided through this concept should not be considered “legal”
matters. So long as there are no legal means of identifying a child’s best
interests, courts cannot play a real role in determining custody.
Current family law—specifically the regulation of divorce and
custody, but possibly other areas as well—is inadequate not because the
relationships with which it deals are not important, but rather because they
are so important. Families simply present more aspects, possibilities, and
needs than legal practitioners are trained to deal with. Accordingly, the
importance of these matters does not justify an over-reliance on legal
tradition or an under-accounting of the ways in which the world, the family,
and the law have changed. Only with theoretical clarity, proper regulation,
and fitting institutions will the family and its members be properly served.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Glendon, supra note 2, at 455.
Oliver Tearle, A Short Analysis of John Donne’s ‘No Man Is an Island’ Meditation,
INTERESTING LITERATURE, https://interestingliterature.com/2020/06/john-donne-no-manis-an-island-for-whom-the-bell-tolls-meditation-analysis/
[https://perma.cc/76HW-LTZF]
(quoting JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS, Meditation XII, 211
(1624)).
230
231

2021]

THE OUTLAWED FAMILY

605

It was once argued that “the family law legal system is broken.” 232
This Paper examines this argument. We have explored the historical
developments concerning the three core aspects of family law disputes—
divorce, custody, and property division—as a means by which to ponder the
relationship between “the family” and the law. This Paper illuminates the
evolution of this relationship by way of the questions discussed and stresses
their importance and ramifications. The three aspects examined reveal
substantive changes and a shift away from the traditional notion of family
law. Each individual modification, alone, might seem insignificant. But
when considered together, in light of their effect on all three core disputes,
a more substantive and unique transformation emerges.
Indeed, the findings of this Paper allude to the same conclusion
upon which Savigny arrived. What is now commonly called “family law” is
not a conceptual union that behaves like one. 233 Rather, some aspects of the
family—those revolving around personal relationships—have become ever
more emotional and have drifted away from the law. While another aspect—
composed of interpersonal obligations—remains within the firm grip of the
law, with a more nuanced approach towards the needs of the family and its
members.
Regardless of the future legal classification of these questions,
surely “the family” deserves better solutions than those currently available.
Reaching the exact equilibrium between “the family” and modern law is no
easy task. It is a balancing act influenced by politics, religion, social norms,
and other mighty forces. This Paper’s attempt is only the first step in this
journey, and it seeks to begin the process by shedding light on the
shortcomings of the existing situation and by calling for a change.

Marsha B. Freeman, Comparing Philosophies and Practices of Family Law Between the
United States and Other Nations: The Flintstones vs. The Jetsons, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 249,
232

249 (2010).
See VON SAVIGNY, supra note 17, at 282.
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